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Abstract—We propose a reversible face de-identification
method for low resolution video data, where landmark-based
techniques cannot be reliably used. Our solution is able to
generate a photo realistic de-identified stream that meets the
data protection regulations and can be publicly released under
minimal privacy constraints. Notably, such stream encapsulates
all the information required to later reconstruct the original
scene, which is useful for scenarios, such as crime investigation,
where the identification of the subjects is of most importance.
We describe a learning process that jointly optimizes two main
components: 1) a public module, that receives the raw data and
generates the de-identified stream, where the ID information
is surrogated in a photo-realistic and seamless way; and 2)
a private module, designed for legal/security authorities, that
analyses the public stream and reconstructs the original scene,
disclosing the actual IDs of all the subjects in the scene. The
proposed solution is landmarks-free and uses a conditional
generative adversarial network to generate synthetic faces that
preserve pose, lighting, background information and even facial
expressions. Also, we enable full control over the set of soft
facial attributes that should be preserved between the raw and
de-identified data, which broads the range of applications for
this solution. Our experiments were conducted in three different
visual surveillance datasets (BIODI, MARS and P-DESTRE) and
showed highly encouraging results. The source code is available
at https://github.com/hugomcp/uu-net.
Index Terms—Visual Surveillance, Video Processing,
Anonymization, Privacy, Security and Forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
V Ideo-based surveillance regards the act of watching aperson or a place, esp. a person believed to be involved
with criminal activity or a place where criminals gather1.
While this kind of technologies has been sustaining the growth
of social monitoring and control tools, it also hosts crime
prevention measures throughout the world, raising the debates
about proper security/privacy balance solutions [47].
Anonymising publicly-recorded video streams has been
regarded as a potential solution to privacy issues, in order
to comply with data privacy regulations like GDPR2 and
CCPA3. In this context, the earliest de-identification techniques
obfuscated privacy-sensitive identity information by low-level
image processing operations, such as downsampling, blurring
or masking (e.g., [5] and [35]). However, these methods also
destroy any privacy-insensitive information and decrease the
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photo realism of the resulting streams, which compromises
their utility.
Recently, more sophisticated de-identification techniques
were proposed (e.g., [16], [31] and [44]) based in active
appearance models (AAMs) and facial landmarks. In partic-
ular, conditional Generative Adversarial Networks (cGANs)
have become a popular way to control the appearance of the
synthesised data, with various applications reported in the
literature, from cross-domain/view image synthesis, text-to-
image translation to fashion synthesis (e.g., [25], [38], [57]
and [60]).
Ue
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xi,j,k
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Reversed Stream
ri,j,k
1 5 6
2
3
4
1 Anonymization: ID(x.) 6= ID(a.)
4 Temp. Consist.: ID(ai,j,k) = ID(ai,j,k′ )3 Diversity : ID(ai,.,.) 6= ID(aj,.,.)
2 Reversibility: r. = Ud
(
Ue(x.)
)
= x.
5 Pose Consistency: (xi,j,k , ai,j,k) 6 Background Consist. : (xi,j,k , ai,j,k)
Ud
Fig. 1. Key properties demanded to a reversible video de-identifier: the iden-
tity of every face in the public stream should be surrogated (1), while keeping
pose (5) and background (6) information to assure seamless transitions and
photo realism. Also, the de-identified faces should be diverse among identities
(3) and consistent (4) across multiple frames of a sequence. Finally, it should
be possible to reconstruct the original stream (2) exclusively based in the
publicly released data.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, reversible video de-identification
is a challenging task. Not only the original stream needs to
be seamless modified, keeping concerns about distortions or
other visual artefacts, but also the identity of the subjects must
be obfuscated in a visually pleasant way, while considering
constraints such as the background information, pose and
lighting conditions.
In this work, we consider that faces are the most sensitive
identifiers in public data. We propose a reversible video face
de-identification solution based in a two-phase adversarial
learning process. In inference time, our model is decomposed
into two disjoint parts: 1) an encoder Ue that receives the raw
data and generates their de-identified version, ensuring IDs de-
identification and temporal consistency, while preserving pose,
lighting, background information and even facial expressions.
This produces the public stream, guaranteeing its usability for
analytics tools and social media; and 2) a decoder Ud that
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is available only to authorities and reconstructs the original
scene exclusively based in the publicly available stream. Note
that neither the original stream nor any kind of sensitive meta-
information are ever stored or transmitted over the network,
assuring the individuals’ right to privacy (for public exposure
purposes), while still enabling the disclosure of the actual IDs
in a crime scene.
The root of our solution is a cGAN composed of two se-
quential U-shaped models [41] (hence UU-Net), used respec-
tively for de-identification/reconstruction purposes. At first, a
multi-label pairwise CNN classifier is inferred, to perceive
the matching labels (ID, gender, ethnicity, hairstyle and age)
between pairs of images. This network is further used in
the main learning phase, which works under the adversar-
ial learning paradigm: the generator network considers the
pairwise responses and attempts to fool a PatchGAN [25]
discriminator, responsible to distinguish between the raw,
anonymised and reconstructed faces. Depending of a weights
(positive, negative ou null) given to every component of the
pairwise discriminator responses, we keep full control over
the appearance of the anonymised faces, i.e., we are able to
determine the labels that should agree/disagree/be independent
between the raw and anonymised faces.
Considering that our method was designed to work in poor
resolution data, we kept it landmarks-free and independent
of a previous face alignment based in fiducial points. In-
stead, it exclusively depends of a low-resolution face detector
(e.g., [39] [13]). Then, in inference time, once the generator
Ue creates the anonymised faces, we use image steganog-
raphy [14] to seamlessly hide information of the bounding
boxes in the public stream. This information is used for
reconstruction purposes, to define the regions-of-interest that
will be reversed by the decoder Ud. In summary, we provide
the following contributions:
• we propose a two-stage learning process and a simple
architecture to de-identify sequences of facial images in
poor resolution video streams;
• based on the responses provided by an image pairwise
analyzer, we keep full control over the properties of the
anonymized faces, which broads the range of potential
applications for our solution;
• using image steganography techniques, we encapsulate
the anonymised faces and the corresponding regions-of-
interests in the public video stream, that can be released
without compromising the individuals’ right to privacy in
public spaces;
• based exclusively in the publicly available data, the
second part of our model is able to reconstruct the
original scenes and disclosure the actual ID of the
subjects in the scene. The idea is that this module is
exclusively available to legal authorities, in crime scene
investigation scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II summarizes the most relevant research in the scope
of the paper. Section III provides a detailed description of
the proposed method. Section IV discusses the results of
our empirical evaluation, and the conclusions are given in
Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
This section summarizes the existing works in the image-
based/video face de-identification context.
A. Image-Based Face De-identification
The earliest methods used simple image processing oper-
ations, such as blacking-out, pixelation or blurring (e.g., [5]
and [35]), and yielded poor realistic anonymised faces. Later,
Blanz et al. [3] estimated the shape, pose and illumination
in pairs of faces, and fitted morphable 3-D models to each
one, rendering new faces by transferring parameters between
a source and a target model. [36] proposed an eigenvector-
based solution in which faces are reconstructed by a fraction
of the eigenface vectors, such that ID information is lost.
Similarly, Seo et al. [46]’s method was based on watermarking,
hashing and PCA representations of data. Bitouk et al. [4]
proposed a method that replaces a target by a gallery element,
selected according to its similarity to the query. Gross et
al. [19] used multi-factor models that unify linear, bilinear
and quadratic data fitting solutions, but requiring a AAM to
provide landmarks information.
The k-Same algorithm [34] provided the rationale for var-
ious techniques. Considering the k-anonymity model [48],
linear combinations of the gallery elements are obtained per
probe, creating realistic anonymised data that depends on the
alignment between the gallery/probe elements. Du et al. [15]
used samples of the gallery data to change the query image,
obtianing ”average” faces that lack in terms of photo realism.
There are various recent methods still based in this concept,
such as the k-Same-Net [32] and the attributes preserving
approaches due to Jourabloo et al. [26] and Yan et al. [55].
Upon the deep learning breakthrough, Korshunova et
al. [28] learned one generative model per identity. Also, by
restricting the output patches to gallery elements of the same
identity, this solution limits the variability of the results.
Starting from segmented human silhouettes, Brkic et al. [6]
proposed a model where obfuscation depends on the masked
input data used. DeepPrivacy [24] anonymises facial images
while retaining the original data distribution, for photo realism
purposes. This model uses a cGAN, the central part of the face
and pose information that is encoded in additional channels of
the input data. Li and Lyu [30] used a face attribute transfer
model to preserve the consistency of non-identity attributes
between the input and anonymised data. Sun et al. [50]
combined parametric face synthesis techniques and GANs,
keeping control over the facial parameters while adding fine
details and realism into the resulting images. This approach
depends of a computationally demanding face alignment step.
Yamac et al. [54] introduced a reversible privacy-preserving
compression method, that combines multi-level encryption
with compressive sensing. Finally, Gu et al. [20] described
a generative adversarial learning scheme based in image data
and passwords that are fed to the models by additional
input channels. The idea is to train a generative model that
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reconstructs the original input only when the original password
is given as input of the reversal phase.
B. Face De-identification in Videos
The earliest approach was due to Dufaux et al. [16],
which scrambled the quantized transform coefficient of 4 ×
4 facial blocks by random flipping/permutations, allowing
reversibility but completely failing in photo realism. Agrawal
and Narayanan [1] performed 3D segmentation (in space and
time) and then blurred data in both domains to prevent reversal.
Dale et al. [11] used 3D multilinear models to track the
facial appearance of pairs of source/target videos. Using 3D
geometry, they warp the source to the target face and refined
the source to match the target appearance, keeping concerns
about the temporal consistency of the result. Samarzija and
Ribaric [44] grouped the gallery faces according to ID/pose
information, representing each cluster by an AAM. Queries
are matched to each AAM and the best match is used as
anonymised data.
Ren et al. [40] proposed a GAN-based video face
anonymizer where the de-identified versions of the input
are obtained such that preserve action information. Gafni et
al. [18] proposed a feed-forward encoder-decoder architecture
that fuses the input data to the masked output of a U-net
backbone. This method requires facial landmarks to produce
visually acceptable high resolution data. Sun et al. [51]
proposed a GAN-based solution that partially changes the
face texture, according to facial landmarks and head pose
information that are given as input. Bao et al. [2] proposed
a GAN-based framework to synthesise a face from two input
images, one used for identity and the other for style attributes
preservation. Similarly, Shen and Liu [49] described a solution
for editing facial attributes that is much similar to He et
al. [23]’s solution. However, both solutions lack in terms of
the temporal consistency across the different frames. Maximov
et al. [31] proposed the CIAGAN, also based on conditional
GANs, to obtain de-identified versions of the input, while
keeping control of the soft biometric features of the output
data. This method produces realistic high resolution images,
yet it also requires the availability of facial landmarks for
proper alignment.
There are also various examples for real-time video pri-
vacy protection, where anonymity is assured by face mask-
ing [45], cryptographic obscuration [10], encryption [52] or
blurring [33].
C. Face Attributes Transfer
Face de-identification is closely related to transferring
(swapping) attributes in human faces, which has been also mo-
tivating several works. Zong et al. [59] used mid-level features
of a CNN as disentangled representations of facial features,
while Cao et al. [8] proposed a Multi-task CNN with partially
shared layers that learn facial attributes. Xiao et al. [53]
proposed the ELEGANT framework, that infers a disentangled
representation in a latent space, where the various components
refer different facial attributes in a quasi-independent way.
The Attribute-GAN [23] and Style-GAN [27] are other good
examples of generative models that change facial features,
while retaining all the other types of information. As described
in the next section, the method proposed in this paper inherits
several insights from both [23] and [27].
III. THE UU-NET: REVERSIBLE FACE
DE-IDENTIFICATION IN VIDEO DATA
A global perspective of our method is shown in Fig. 2. The
learning process is divided into two phases: 1) we start by ob-
taining an auxiliary pairwise attribute matcher Da that predicts
the common labels (ID, gender, ethnicity, age and hairstyle)
between image pairs; and 2) use the Da responses to constraint
the properties of the de-identified samples in the adversarial
learning phase, along with an adversarial discriminator Df that
distinguishes between the input images x and the outputs of
the generator (Ue and Ud).
A. Learning Phase 1: ’Same’/ ’Different’ Pairwise Attributes
Classifier
Let xli,j,k represent the kth frame from the jth sequence of
the ith subject in the learning set. Also, let ali,j,k represent the
corresponding de-identified data and rli,j,k the reconstructed
version. l ∈ Nt denotes the ground-truth attributes from x. We
consider t = 4, for {ID, gender, ethnicity, hairstyle} labels.
For every pair of images xl/x′l
′
, we define a binary vector b
zeroed in the positions of the disagreeing labels between l and
l’:
b =
[
1{l1==l′1}, . . . ,1{lt==l′t}
]
, (1)
where ”==” stands for the equality test operator and 1 is the
characteristic function. The attribute classifier Da: Nn×Nn →
Nt receives a pair of images (each of length n) and predicts
their common labels:
bˆ = Da(xl, x′l
′
). (2)
We use a cross-entropy loss for the pairwise attribute
classifier Da, which is trained using the ground-truth b and
predicted bˆ attributes, according to:
Lce = Eb,bˆ − bT log(bˆ)− (
−→
1
T − bT ) log(1− bˆ), (3)
with
−→
1 representing an all-ones vector of t components, and
the logarithmic operation being applied component-wise to
every element of its input. The inferred classifier is given by:
D∗a = argminDa
Lce. (4)
B. Learning Phase 2: Reversible De-Identification
The next step is the main learning phase, where the de-
identifier and reconstructor networks are inferred. We start
by defining a vector s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}t where the positive
coefficients denote labels that should be consistent between
the image pairs, the negative coefficients represent labels
that should disagree and the zeros determine independence
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Learning Phase 1
Da
0 ID
1 Gender
1 Ethnicity
...
0 Hairstyle
Lce
Learning Phase 2
xi,j,k
Ue
ai,j,k
Ud
ri,j,k
LmseLdis
Df
1: x.
-1: a.| r.
LadvDa
ai,j,k
xi,j,k
s
-1
0
1
...
1
Lano
0
1
0
...
1
Da
ai,j,k′
ai,j,k
0
0
1
...
1
Lcon Da
ai′,.,.
ai,.,.
0
0
1
...
1
Ldiv
Shared Layers L =
∑
i∈{mse, adv, ano, con, dis, div} ωi Li
Inference
Head
Detection [39]
xi,j,k
Ue
Steganography
(encoding) [14]
Steganography
(decoding)
ai,j,k
Ud
ri,j,k
Raw Stream Published Stream Private Stream
Fig. 2. Cohesive perspective of the proposed method. During phase 1, we learn a pairwise attributes matcher Da that determines the shared labels between
image pairs. Next, a double-U sequential architecture is proposed, where the first part Ue receives the raw data xand produces the de-identified versions a,
complemented by the reverser Ud that exclusively analyzes the de-identified data and reconstructs the original samples x. The pairwise matcher is used as
basis of the anonymization, temporal consistency and diversity losses, along with an adversarial discriminator Da that enforces the facial appearance of the
generated data. In inference time, a state-of-the-art head detector is used to crop the regions that fed the Ue network. Next, using steganography techniques,
the anonymized regions-of-interest are hidden in the published stream, released with minimal privacy concerns. Finally, such public streams are used by the
reverser network Ud, available to legal authorities, that is able to reconstruct the original scenes and disclosure the actual identities in the scene.
between labels (Fig. 3). s weights the responses provided
Da and serves to broad the range of applications for the
proposed method, depending of the desired properties for the
de-identified data. In every case, the ID position of s is always
set to -1, guaranteeing the de-identification feature.
0
Hs
0
Age
0
Eth
1
Ge
-1
ID
s: → ”De-identify the data, keepingthe ’gender’ of the original samples”
-1
Hs
0
Age
0
Eth
0
Ge
-1
ID
s: → ”De-identify the data, changingthe ’hairstyle’ of the original samples”
Fig. 3. Illustration of the effect that different s parameterizations have in
the de-identified data. We keep control of the soft labels in the de-identified
faces, imposing agreement/disagreement or even make values independent
with respect to the original data.
The first term is the reconstruction loss Lmse, that guar-
antees the fidelity of the samples reconstructed by Ud with
respect to x. To this end, not only the reconstructor Ud should
perfectly reconstruct x, but the de-identifier Ue should also en-
capsulate hidden features in a. that enable such reconstruction.
It is given by:
Lmse = ||x. − Ud
(
Ue(x.)
)||2. (5)
The adversarial loss is introduced by a face plausibility
discriminator Df , that is responsible to distinguish between
the input samples x and their encoded counterparts, either
the de-identified a. = Ue(x.) or the reconstructed samples
r. = Ud(a.) = Ud
(
Ue(x.)
)
In practice, this component forces
the encoded data to have facial appearance, as both parts of
generator Ue and Ud will attempt to fool Df during the ad-
versarial learning process. From the discriminator perspective,
this loss is formulated as:
Ladv1 = −2.Ex Df (x.) + Ea. Df (a.) + Er. Df (r.),
s.t. ||Df ||∞ ≤ δgp, (6)
where ||.||∞ denotes the maximum gradient allowed δgp to
avoid mode collapse and enhance training stability, according
to the WGAN-GP scheme [21]. The optimal discriminator is
formulated as:
D∗f = argminDf
Ladv1 . (7)
From the encoder perspective, the corresponding terms in
the loss formulation have an opposite sign:
Ladv2 = −Ea Df (a.)− Er Df (r.). (8)
All the remaining terms evolved in the generator use
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the previously learned pairwise discriminator Da(., .). The
anonymization loss forces that pairs of x./a. elements follow
the attribute configuration determined by s:
Lano = Exi,j,k,ai,j,ks
(
2.Da(xi,j,k, ai,j,k)− 1
)
, (9)
where  denotes the inner product and the (2.Da(., .) − 1)
term maps the output of Da into the [-1, 1] scale. Similarly,
the temporal consistency loss guarantees that any samples of
the same subject sequence ai,j,k/ai,j,k′ share all the attributes,
for photo realism purposes:
Lcon = −Eai,j,k,ai,j,k′
−→
1  Da(ai,j,k, ai,j,k′), (10)
with
−→
1 ∈ Nt denoting an all-ones row vector of t components.
The diversity loss assures that different sequences of the
same subject ai,j,./ai,j′,. are mapped to different virtual iden-
tities, to avoid any malicious inference of subjects and scenes
properties:
Ldiv = Exi,j,.,ai,j,.
−→
1  Da(ai,j,., ai,j′,.). (11)
Finally, the distribution loss assures that the color distri-
butions of a elements and the corresponding original samples
x are similar, which augments the photo realism of the results
and the resemblance of the original lighting conditions:
Ldis = Exi,j,k,ai,j,kχ2h(x),h(a), (12)
where h(.) represents the histogram operator and χ2v(1),v(2)
denotes the Chi-square distance between the distributions of
(v(1), v(2)) given by
∑
i
(v(1)i −v(2)i )2
v(1)i +v
(2)
i
, with v(.)i is the ith bin
density.
Overall, the full loss function is the weighted sum of the
above described terms:
U∗e,U
∗
d = arg minUe,Ud
ωmseLmse + ωadvLadv2+
ωanoLano + ωconLcon + ωdivLdiv + ωdisLdis, (13)
where ω. are the hyper-parameters that weight the importance
of each term in the learning process (details about the values
used are given in Section IV).
C. Image Steganography
Steganography is used in this work for two purposes: 1) to
avoid that the head detector is used both in the de-identification
and reconstruction phases; and, most importantly, 2) to assure
that the region-of-interest (ROI) to reconstruct each a. is the
same used to previously crop x.. This is a sensitive point, as
we observed a decrease in the fidelity of the reconstructed
data, in case of misalignments between the ROIs cropped
for corresponding x./a. elements. Hence, we encapsulate the
output of the head detector [39] in the public stream, using
the following protocol:
message := n + ”,’ + [bound. box]n
bound. box := x + ”,” + y + ”,” + w + ”,” + h + ”,”
n := {N}
x := {N}
y := {N}
w := {N}
h := {N},
where n denotes the number of bounding boxes (faces) in the
frame, [.]n denotes n occurrences of one element, {N} stands
for ”one natural number” and (x, y, w, h) provide the top left
corner (x, y), plus the width w and height h of the box.
This way, every frame in the public stream encapsu-
lates (using [14]) the number and position of all head re-
gions (ROIs) in the frame. As an example, the message
”2,10,16,9,15,25,45,8,14,” corresponds to two ROIs in a
frame, one starting at position (10, 16), with dimensions
(9, 15) and another starting at position (25, 45) with dimen-
sions (8, 14).
D. Inference
For security purposes, the data are de-identified before being
published or transmitted through the networks (bottom row of
Fig. 2). This can be done in situ, embedded in the camera
hardware and starts by the detection [39] of the human heads
in each frame (using [22] or [37]). Next, the facial images x.
feed the Ue generator, that returns the de-identified versions
a.. Such virtual IDs are then overlapped in the each frame of
the video sequence, with image steganography [14] used to
hidden information about all the ROIs.
The second part of the generator Ud is supposed to be
private and exclusively available to authorities. Upon a security
incident, the de-identified stream contains all the information
required to reconstruct the original scene and disclosure the
actual ID of the subjects in the scene. Using [14], we get the
positions of the bounding boxes of the anonymised faces in
every frame and feed Ud, that is responsible to reconstruct x.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Datasets and Empirical Protocol
Our experiments were conducted in one proprietary (BIODI)
and two freely available visual surveillance datasets (MARS
and P-DESTRE).
The BIODI4 dataset is proprietary of Tomiworld R©5, and
is composed of 849,932 images from 13,876 sequences,
taken from 216 indoor/outdoor video surveillance sequences.
All images are manually annotated for 14 labels: {’gender’,
’age’, ’height’, ’body volume’, ’ethnicity’, ’hair color’ and
’hairstyle’, ’beard’, ’moustache’, ’glasses’ and ’clothing’
(x4)}. As this set is not annotated for ID, the face recognition
experiments were exclusively performed in the remaining sets.
MARS [58] contains 1,261 IDs from around 20,000 tracklets,
4http://di.ubi.pt/∼hugomcp/BIODI/
5https://tomiworld.com/
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automatically extracted by the Deformable Part Model [17]
detector and the GMMCP [12] tracker. In this set, the soft la-
bels {’gender’, ’ethnicity”} were automatically inferred by the
Matlab SDK for Face++6 system, and the ethnicity was man-
ually annotated. Finally, the P-DESTRE [29] dataset provides
video sequences of pedestrians in outdoor environments (taken
from UAVs), and is fully annotated at the frame level, for ID
and 16 soft labels: ’gender’, ’age’, ’height’, ’body volume’,
’ethnicity’, ’hair colour’, ’hairstyle’, ’beard’, ’moustache’,
’glasses’, ’head accessories’, ’body accessories’, ’action’ and
’clothing information’ (x3). It contains 253 identities and over
14.8M bounding boxes.
B
IO
D
I
M
A
R
S
P-
D
E
ST
R
E
Fig. 4. Datasets used in the empirical validation of the method proposed
in this paper. From top to bottom rows, images of the BIODI, MARS and
P-DESTRE are shown.
The image pairwise matcher Da uses a classic VGG-like
architecture, detailed in Table I. A different model was inferred
independently for each label (ID, gender, ethnicity, age and
hairstyle). Then, during inference, the pairs of RGB images
to be matched were resized and concatenated along the depth
axis, resulting in 64 × 64 × 6 inputs, from where the 5-
dimensional binary output vectors were inferred.
For the second learning phase, both the encoder Ue and
decoder Ud models share the well known U-Net architec-
ture [41], with a minor adaptation to receive 64 × 64 × 4
(encoder) and 64×64×3 (decoder) data. The encoder receives
the raw facial images represented in the RGB space (scaled to
the unit interval) and a forth channel of random values drew
from a uniform distribution in the unit interval U(0, 1). The
adversarial discriminative model Df uses the PatchGAN [25]
architecture. Upon empirical optimization and grounded on
6http://www.faceplusplus.com/
the human perception of the generated a. elements, we set
δgp=0.01 to assure the stability of the adversarial learning
process and the weight parameters: ωmse=50, ωadv=1, ωano=1,
ωcon=1, ωdis=1 and ωdiv=1.
TABLE I
ARCHITECTURE OF THE CNN MODELS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS.
(’NK’: NUMBER OF KERNELS; ’KS’: KERNEL SIZE; ’ST’: STRIDE; ’MM’:
MOMENTUM).
Da model Ue model
Input: (64×64×6)→ Convolution (nk: 16, ks: 3 × 3,
st: 2)→ Batch Normalization (mm: 0.8)→ LeakyReLU
→ Dropout (0.25)→ Convolution (nk: 64, ks: 3 × 3, st:
1)→ Batch Normalization (mm: 0.8)→ LeakyReLU→
Dropout (0.25) → Convolution (nk: 128, ks: 3 × 3, st:
1)→ Batch Normalization (mm: 0.8)→ LeakyReLU→
Dropout (0.25) → [Convolution (nk: 64, ks: 3 × 3, st:
2)→ BN (mm: 0.8)→ LeakyReLU→ Dropout (0.25)]
× 2 → Flatten → Dense (128) → ReLU → Dense (t)
→ Sigmoid
Input: (64×64×4)
→ U-Net [41]
Ud model
Input: (64×64×3)
→U-Net [41]
Df model
Input: (64×64×3)
→ PatchGAN [25]
To our knowledge, there are no prior works to perform re-
versible de-identification in video data. Though, we considered
the two baselines to compare the face detection effectiveness
in de-identified data: the Super-pixel [7] method: that replaces
each pixel by the average value of the corresponding super-
pixel and the classical Blur-based method [42], where images
are downsampled to extreme low-resolution and then upsam-
pled back.
B. Face Detection
The photo-realism of the de-identified data was evaluated
by comparing the face detection scores in the raw x. and de-
identified a. samples, according to [56]. This method provides
a confidence score fc(.) for having a face at a certain position.
The results for the three data sets are shown in Fig. 5, where
the scatter plots correlate the confidence values between x
(horizontal axis) and a elements (vertical axis). The histograms
provide the distributions for x/a values. Overall, the average
values for a images decreased about 2.11% (BIODI), 3.22%
(MARS) and 4.40% (P-DESTRE) with respect to x elements
(BIODI: fc(x)= 0.954→ fc(a)= 0.931, MARS: fc(x)= 0.968→
fc(a)= 0.930 and P-DESTRE: fc(x)= 0.918 → fc(a)= 0.877).
Also, minimal levels of linear correlation were observed
between the x/a values, with Pearson’s coefficients of 0.011
(BIODI), 0.023 (MARS) and 0.025 (P-DESTRE).
Table II summarizes the face detection effectiveness [56]
on a. data, with respect to the performance in x.. Also, as
baselines, we provide the results obtained by two simple
de-identification techniques (due to Butler et al. [7] and
Ryoo et al. [42]). For these experiments, random samples
composed of 90% of the test samples were created (drew
with repetition) and the mean Average Precision (mAP) taken
in each split, from where the mean and standard deviation
values were taken. The proposed solution attained mAP values
for a. elements that were about 89% (BIODI), 89% (MARS)
and 93% (P-DESTRE) of the values obtained for x.. Errors
occurred typically for extreme poor resolution samples where
the detection method was still able to find the original face, but
not the de-identified version. Also, the de-identified versions
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Fig. 5. Scatter plot of the correlation between the MTCNN [56] face detection
confidence scores fc(.) for x. and a. elements, obtained for the BIODI, MARS
and P-DESTRE sets (left plots). The corresponding histograms of the x. and
a. values are given at the right side.
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FACE DETECTION PERFORMANCE [56] IN
THE DE-IDENTIFIED DATA, WITH RESPECT TO THE BASELINE DETECTION
VALUES. AVERAGE ± STANDARD DEVIATION ”MEAN AVERAGE
PRECISION’ VALUES ARE GIVEN.
Method Params. BIODI MARS
P-
DESTRE
Baseline Detection mAP [56] (x.) 0.82 ± 0.02 0.84 ± 0.03 0.63 ± 0.01
Proposed
ωmse=50,
ωadv=1,
ωano=1,
ωcon=1,
ωdiv=1,
ωdis=1
0.73 ± 0.06 0.75 ± 0.06 0.59 ± 0.10
Butler et al. [7] 8superpixels 0.23 ± 0.06 0.21 ± 0.04 0.20 ± 0.04
Butler et al. [7] 16superpixels 0.36 ± 0.05 0.32 ± 0.04 0.22 ± 0.05
Ryoo et al. [42] resolution5x3 0.20 ± 0.03 0.19 ± 0.03 0.17 ± 0.02
Ryoo et al. [42] resolution7x4 0.31 ± 0.04 0.27 ± 0.04 0.16 ± 0.06
tend to feature less details (i.e., lower entropy) than the
original samples, which might justify this gap in performance.
The remaining techniques got far worse performance, even
stressing that both not aim at reversibility.
C. Face Recognition
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the decision environments resulting from the
VGG-Face2 [9] face recognition method in pairs of images of the MARS and
P-DESTRE datasets (x ↔ x’, left plots) and when the second image in each
pairwise comparison was de-identified (x ↔ a, right plots).
A second important question to address is the possibility of
models being simply swapping faces between identities, rather
than creating virtual IDs. To verify this hypothesis, we learned
two VGG-Face2 [9] recognizers (for MARS and for the P-
DESTRE sets), including 80% of the IDs in the learning set (x.
elements). Then, in inference time, we sampled the remaining
20% IDs and created 50K impostors + 10K genuine pairwise
comparisons (x↔ x). This experiment was repeated when de-
identifying the second image of each pair (i.e., x↔ a). Results
are given in Fig. 6, that compares the decision environments
for the MARS (top plots) and P-DESTRE (bottom plots) sets.
The green bars correspond to the distributions of the genuine
scores, while the red bars denote the impostors distributions.
The decidability values of the decision environments were also
obtained (d′ = µG−µI√
σ2G+σ
2
I
), where (µ, σ) denote the mean and
standard deviation statistics and ’G’/’I’ stand for the genuine
and impostors pairwise comparisons. Values decreased from
1.885 (MARS) and 0.839 (P-DESTRE) (x ↔ x) to 0.162
(MARS) and 0.155 (P-DESTRE)(x ↔ a), with an evident
movement of the genuine distributions toward the impostors
region. The corresponding decreases in the AUC values were
of MARS: 0.962 → 0.570 and P-DESTRE: 0.820 → 0.568,
in both cases turning the identification based in the a. samples
almost equivalent to a random choice. Even though, a slight
difference between the right tails of the genuine/impostors
distributions was observed in both sets, which was justified by
potential overfitting problems, i.e., lack of sufficient learning
data to sustain enough variability in the de-identified space of
identities.
D. Temporal Consistency
The temporal consistency of the de-identified samples is of
most importance for photo-realism purposes. In a subjective
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evaluation perspective, Fig. 7 provides several examples of
(x, a, r) elements, obtained for different frames of the same
sequence at time t and t + i. In all cases, an evident consis-
tency between the features generated for at and at+i can be
observed.
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Fig. 7. Top rows: Examples that illustrate the temporal consistency required
for video de-identification. Each group provides two within-subject examples
of a sequence x taken at time t and t + i, i ≥ 1. The central column
in each group provides the de-identified images a, and the reconstructed
samples are given at the rightmost column r. The bottom row shows the
decision environments obtained when the genuine pairwise comparisons were
exclusively composed of ai,j,t/ai,j,t+k elements.
To provide a quantitative measure of temporal consistency,
we compared the decision environments for the MARS and
P-DESTRE sets when the genuine pairwise comparisons
were exclusively composed of ai,j,t/ai,j,t+k elements, with
k ∈ {1, . . . , sl} (sl is the sequence length). The impostors
distributions were obtained as in the previous experiments
and contextualize the genuine scores. The bottom row in
Fig. 7 provides the results for both sets, where the separation
between the impostors’ and the genuine scores is evident.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to compare both
empirical data distributions, with the null hypothesis (’both
samples come from the same distribution’) being rejected
with asymptotic p-values lower than 1e−8 in MARS and P-
DESTRE. When comparing these results to the values given
in Figs. 6, note that in the later case, only samples of the
same session were considered as genuine pairs, which justifies
the larger separability between the genuine/impostors distribu-
tions. In both cases, the genuine scores spread in a relatively
homogeneous way in the unit interval, yet there is still a
fraction of cases (< 15%) where consecutive de-identified
elements of one subject suddenly change their appearance and
even soft labels.
E. Soft Labels Consistency/Inter-Session Diversity
The consistency of the soft labels generated for the de-
identified data and the diversity of the virtual IDs generated
per subject were evaluated according to the responses provided
by the pairwise labels discriminator Da. For the soft labels,
we were interested in confirming if the {’gender’, ’ethnic-
ity’, ’hairstyle’} labels inferred for a. meet the constraints
determined by s in the learning phase. For each ai element,
we obtained the Da(ai, xi) values and measured their Pearson
correlation with respect to the ground-truth labels of x, also
considering the configuration of s. Having drew 50 random
samples composed of 90% of the test samples (with repe-
tition), the linear correlation values are given in Table III,
which were regarded as good indicators of the soft labels
consistency of a. elements. Some examples of the a. elements
generated when s = [’ID’, ’Gender’, ’Ethnicity’, ’Hairstyle’] =
[−1, 1, 1, 1] (’Equal Soft’ labels) and s = [−1,−1,−1,−1]
(’All Different’ labels) are shown in Fig. 8, enabling to perceive
the evidently different features of the a elements according
to the configuration used for s in the learning phase. Also,
we observed that using the ’Equal Soft’ labels configuration
reduces the variability of the synthesised virtual IDs, while
also increasing the similarity in appearance between the x./a.
elements.
TABLE III
PEARSON CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SOFT LABELS INFERRED FOR THE
DE-IDENTIFIED ELEMENTS AND THE DESIRED PROPERTIES DETERMINED
BY S.
Soft Label Consistency BIODI MARS P-DESTRE
Gender 0.818 ± 0.096 0.890 ± 0.081 0.803 ± 0.107
Ethnicity 0.702 ± 0.112 0.750 ± 0.099 0.622 ± 0.144
Hairstyle 0.647 ± 0.106 0.663 ± 0.102 0.594 ± 0.118
The diversity of IDs generated for different sessions is
illustrated in the top rows of Fig. 9. Again, the bottom row
provides the decision environments when the genuine pairs
were exclusively composed of ai,j,./ ai,k,. elements. Here,
even though there is an evident separation between both
distributions (d’ values of 0.491 for MARS and 0.329 for P-
DESTRE sets), both genuine distributions were skewed toward
the higher values region (i.e., corresponding to the typical
genuine region), which suggests that in such cases the IDs
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’Equal Soft’ Labels(
s=[-1, 1, 1, 1]
)
x a r
’All Different’ Labels(
s=[-1, -1, -1, -1]
)
x a r
Fig. 8. Comparison between the de-identification results that are typically
attained when the soft labels coherence/discrepancy is enforced. The left
column provides some examples where the soft labels configuration between
x./a. is kept consistent, while the right column illustrates the results when all
soft labels disagree.
generated for different sessions of one subject might still share
some undesirable patterns.
F. Pose, Background and Facial Expressions Consistency
For photo-realism purposes, not only the pose of x./a. ele-
ments should be consistent, but also the background features
in both images should be similar and even the facial expression
should agree. According to our loss formulation and experi-
ments, we observed that the distribution loss term Ldis plays a
key role in guaranteeing such kinds of consistencies. To quan-
titatively perceive the pose consistency, we compared the pose
estimation yaw, pitch and roll values obtained by the Deep
Head Pose [43] method for x/a elements. As the model was not
specifically trained for each dataset, errors in pose inference
were relatively frequent and covered about 20% of the samples
of the BIODI set, 7% of the elements in MARS and 28%
of the P-DESTRE images. These cases were rejected under
human inspection. For the remaining cases, we measured the
absolute difference between the 3D angle values, obtaining
average yaw errors of 0.177 ± 0.091, 0.184 ± 0.087, 0.140
± 0.075 (BIODI, MAR, P-DESTRE), pitch errors of 0.101 ±
0.068, 0.120 ± 0.070, 0.113 ± 0.055 and roll errors 0.021 ±
0.006, 0.0.25 ± 0.005, 0.022 ± 0.004 (in radians), which we
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Fig. 9. Top rows: diversity of the de-identified samples for different sessions
(sequences) of a single subject. The bottom row provides the decision
environments obtained for the MARS (at left) and P-DESTRE (at right) sets,
when the genuine pairs were exclusively composed of ai,j,./ ai,k,. elements.
regarded to positively confirm the coherence in pose between
the x/a elements. The consistency of the remaining factors
(background and facial expressions) was only perceived in a
subjective way, under visual perception. Figure 10 illustrates
the three types of consistencies addressed in this section.
G. Ablation Experiments And Difficult Cases
The most frequent variations in the results with respect to
changes in the parameterizations of the loss formulation are
illustrated in Table IV. The left column gives the changes in
each parameter with respect to the configuration considered
optimal (described in sec. IV-A), and the images in the right
column illustrate the typical failure cases. In this experiment,
every parameter was orthogonally decreased (↓) or augmented
(↑) one order of magnitude in the learning phase. At first, when
the ωmse weight was decreased, the reconstructed samples
started to appear pixelized and blurred. As an effect of the
variation of ωano weight, x/a started to resemble each other in
a much more evident way, and in some cases the Ue started
to work practically as an identity operator. Decreasing the
weights of the adversarial discriminator ωadv had a catastrophic
effect in the a results, that completely loosen their face appear-
ance. When decreasing the ωdiv parameter, the de-identified
images started to look alike their x counterparts, while the
ωcon weight stressed the temporal consistency requirements.
By decreasing the value of the ωdis parameter, the resulting
a elements have very different color/brightness distributions
with respect to x, which strongly decreases the photo realism.
Finally, another catastrophic change occurred when the max-
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Fig. 10. Examples illustrating the background consistency (upper row), pose consistency (middle row) and facial expressions consistency (bottom row)
between the raw samples x and their de-identified versions a.
imum gradient δgp allowed for adjusting the weights of the
adversarial discriminator in the learning phase was increased,
which typically causes the divergence of the training phase.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addressed the security/privacy balance in visual
surveillance environments. While data protection regulations
forbid the public disclosure of personal sensitive information,
there are scenarios, such as crime scene investigation, where
the identification of the subjects is of most importance. Ac-
cordingly, we described a solution composed of one public
module, that detects the faces in each frame and produces
the corresponding de-identified versions, where the identity
information is surrogated in a photo-realistic and seamless
way. Such samples are overlapped in the data stream, which
is published without compromising subjects’ privacy. This
process runs in situ, such that no privacy-sensitive information
is passed through the network. Next, a private module -
available exclusively to law enforcement agencies - is able to
reconstruct the original scene and disclosure the actual identity
of the subjects exclusively based the public stream.
The proposed solution is landmarks-free and particularly
suitable for low resolution data. We designed a two-stage
learning process, with a conditional generative adversarial
network composed of two different entities (an encoder and
a decoder) that have as common goal to fool an adversarial
opponent. This joint optimization process enables them to
intrinsically share knowledge about the image features that
should be hidden in the encoded data to enable proper recon-
TABLE IV
ILLUSTRATION OF THE TYPICAL VARIATIONS IN THE RESULTS OF THE
PROPOSED METHOD WITH RESPECT TO CHANGES IN EACH TERM USED IN
THE LOSS FORMULATION.
Parameter Typical Results
ωmse ↓ (÷10)
x r x r x r
ωadv ↓ (÷10)
x a x a x a
ωano ↓ (÷10)
x a x a x a
ωcon ↓ (÷10)
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
ωdiv ↓ (÷10)
x a x a x a
ωdis ↓ (÷10)
x a x a x a
δgp ↑ (×10)
x a x a x a
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struction. The whole process generates highly realistic faces
that preserve pose, lighting, background and facial expressions
information. Also, it enables full control over the facial
attributes that should be preserved between the raw and de-
identified streams, which is important to broad the applicability
of the system. The experiments were conducted in three visual
surveillance datasets, and support the usability of the proposed
method.
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